Persons of the Dialogue
THEODORUS
SOCRATES
THE ELEATIC STRANGER
THE YOUNGER SOCRATES
Socrates. I owe you many
thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance both
of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.
Theodorus. And in a little while, Socrates,
you will owe me three times as many, when they have
completed for you the delineation of the Statesman
and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.
Soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my
dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness that this
is the estimate formed of them by the great
calculator and geometrician?
Theod. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I mean that you rate them all at the
same value, whereas they are really separated by an
interval, which no geometrical ratio can express.
Theod. By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates,
that is a very fair hit; and shows that you have not
forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on you at
some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger,
who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to
proceed either with the Statesman or with the
Philosopher, whichever he prefers.
Stranger. That is my duty, Theodorus; having
begun I must go on, and not leave the work
unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?
Theod. In what respect?
Str. Shall we relieve him, and take his
companion, the Young Socrates, instead of him? What
do you advise?
Theod. Yes, give the other a turn, as you
propose. The young always do better when they have
intervals of rest.
Soc. I think, Stranger, that both of them may
be said to be in some way related to me; for the
one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face, the
other is called by my name. And we should always be
on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style
of his conversation. I myself was discoursing with
Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been listening
to his answers; my namesake I have not yet examined,
but I must. Another time will, do for me; to-day let
him answer you.
Str. Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear
what the elder Socrates is proposing?
Young Socrates. I do.
Str. And do you agree to his proposal?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. As you do not object, still less can I.
After the Sophist, then, I think that the Statesman
naturally follows next in the order of enquiry. And
please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked
among those who have science.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. Then the sciences must be divided as
before?
Y. Soc. I dare say.
Str. But yet the division will not be the
same?
Y. Soc. How then?
Str. They will be divided at some other
point.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. Where shall we discover the path of the
Statesman? We must find and separate off, and set
our seal upon this, and we will set the mark of
another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the
soul will conceive of ail kinds of knowledge under
two classes.
Y. Soc. To find the path is your business,
Stranger, and not mine.
Str. Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when
once made, must be yours as well as mine.
Y. Soc. Very good.
Str. Well, and are not arithmetic and certain
other kindred arts, merely abstract knowledge,
wholly separated from action?
Y. Soc. True.
Str. But in the art of carpentering and all
other handicrafts, the knowledge of the workman is
merged in his work; he not only knows, but he also
makes things which previously did not exist.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Then let us divide sciences in general
into those which are practical and those which
are-purely intellectual.
Y. Soc. Let us assume these two divisions of
science, which is one whole.
Str. And are "statesman," "king," "master,"
or "householder," one and the same; or is there a
science or art answering to each of these names? Or
rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.
Y. Soc. Let me hear.
Str. If any one who is in a private station
has the skill to advise one of the public
physicians, must not he also be called a physician?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. And if any one who is in a private
station is able to advise the ruler of a country,
may not he be said to have the knowledge which the
ruler himself ought to have?
Y. Soc. True.
Str. But, surely the science of a true king
is royal science?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. And will not he who possesses this
knowledge, whether he happens to be a ruler or a
private man, when regarded only in reference to his
art, be truly called "royal"?
Y. Soc. He certainly ought to be.
Str. And the householder and master are the
same?
Y. Soc. Of course.
Str. Again, a large household may be compared
to a small state:-will they differ at all, as far as
government is concerned?
Y. Soc. They will not.
Str. Then, returning to the point which we
were just now discussing, do we not clearly see that
there is one science of all of them; and this
science may be called either royal or political or
economical; we will not quarrel with any one about
the name.
Y. Soc. Certainly not.
Str. This too, is evident, that the king
cannot do much with his hands, or with his whole
body, towards the maintenance of his empire,
compared with what he does by the intelligence and
strength of his mind.
Y. Soc. Clearly not.
Str. Then, shall we say that the king has a
greater affinity to knowledge than to manual arts
and to practical life in general?
Y. Soc. Certainly he has.
Str. Then we may put all together as one and
the same-statesmanship and the statesman-the kingly
science and the king.
Y. Soc. Clearly.
Str. And now we shall only be proceeding in
due order if we go on to divide the sphere of
knowledge?
Y. Soc. Very good.
Str. Think whether you can find any joint or
parting in knowledge.
Y. Soc. Tell me of what sort.
Str. Such as this: You may remember that we
made an art of calculation?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. Which was, unmistakably, one of the arts
of knowledge?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. And to this art of calculation which
discerns the differences of numbers shall we assign
any other function except to pass judgment on their
differences?
Y. Soc. How could we?
Str. You know that the master-builder does
not work himself, but is the ruler of workmen?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. He contributes knowledge, not manual
labour?
Y. Soc. True.
Str. And may therefore be justly said to
share in theoretical science?
Y. Soc. Quite true.
Str. But he ought not, like the calculator,
to regard his functions as at and when he has formed
a judgment;-he must assign to the individual workmen
their appropriate task until they have completed the
work.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. Are not all such sciences, no less than
arithmetic and the like, subjects of pure knowledge;
and is not the difference between the two classes,
that the one sort has the power of judging only, and
the other of ruling as well?
Y. Soc. That is evident.
Str. May we not very properly say, that of
all knowledge, there are there are two divisions-one
which rules, and the other which judges?
Y. Soc. I should think so.
Str. And when men have anything to do in
common, that they should be of one mind is surely a
desirable thing?
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Then while we are at unity among
ourselves, we need not mind about the fancies of
others?
Y. Soc. Certainly not.
Str. And now, in which of these divisions
shall we place the king?-Is he a judge and a kind of
spectator? Or shall we assign to him the art of
command-for he is a ruler?
Y. Soc. The latter, clearly.
Str. Then we must see whether there is any
mark of division in the art of command too. I am
inclined to think that there is a distinction
similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer,
which parts off the king from the herald.
Y. Soc. How is this?
Str. Why, does not the retailer receive and
sell over again the productions of others, which
have been sold before?
Y. Soc. Certainly he does.
Str. And is not the herald under command, and
does he not receive orders, and in his turn give
them to others?
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Then shall we mingle the kingly art in
the same class with the art of the herald, the
interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the
numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as
in the preceding comparison we spoke of
manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of
retailers,-seeing, too, that the class of supreme
rulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost
nameless-shall we make a word following the same
analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or
ruling-for-self science, leaving the rest to receive
a name from some one else? For we are seeking the
ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who
is not a ruler.
Y. Soc. Very good.
Str. Thus a very fair distinction has been
attained between the man who gives his own commands,
and him who gives another's. And now let us see if
the supreme power allows of any further division.
Y. Soc. By all means.
Str. I think that it does; and please to
assist me in making the division.
Y. Soc. At what point?
Str. May not all rulers be supposed to
command for the sake of producing something?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Nor is there any difficulty in dividing
the things produced into two classes.
Y. Soc. How would you divide them?
Str. Of the whole class some have life and
some are without life.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. And by the help of this distinction we
may make, if we please, a subdivision of the section
of knowledge which commands.
Y. Soc. At what point?
Str. One part may be set over the production
of lifeless, the other of living objects; and in
this way the whole will be divided.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. That division, then, is complete; and
now we may leave one half, and take up the other;
which may also be divided into two.
Y. Soc. Which of the two halves do you men?
Str. Of course that which exercises command
about animals. For, surely, the royal science is not
like that of a master-workman, a science presiding
over lifeless objects;-the king has a nobler
function, which is the management and control of
living beings.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. And the breeding and tending of living
beings may be observed to be sometimes a tending of
the individual; in other cases, a common care of
creatures in flocks?
Y. Soc. True.
Str. But the statesman is not a tender of
individuals-not like the driver or groom of a single
ox or horse; he is rather to be compared with the
keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.
Y. Soc. Yes, I see, thanks to you.
Str. Shall we call this art of tending many
animals together, the art of managing a herd, or the
art of collective management?
Y. Soc. No matter;-Whichever suggests itself
to us in the course of conversation.
Str. Very good, Socrates; and, if you
continue to be not too particular about names, you
will be all the richer in wisdom when you are an old
man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of
the name, -can you see a way in which a person, by
showing the art of herding to be of two kinds, may
cause that which is now sought amongst twice the
number of things, to be then sought amongst half
that number?
Y. Soc. I will try;-there appears to me to be
one management of men and another of beasts.
Str. You have certainly divided them in a
most straightforward and manly style; but you have
fallen into an error which hereafter I think that we
had better avoid.
Y. Soc. What is the error?
Str. I think that we had better not cut off a
single small portion which is not a species, from
many larger portions; the part should be a species.
To separate off at once the subject of
investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the
separation be rightly made; and you were under the
impression that you were right, because you saw that
you would come to man; and this led you to hasten
the steps. But you should not chip off too small a
piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through
the middle; which is also the more likely way of
finding classes. Attention to this principle makes
all the difference in a process of enquiry.
Y. Soc. What do you mean, Stranger?
Str. I will endeavour to speak more plainly
out of love to your good parts, Socrates; and,
although I cannot at present entirely explain
myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my
meaning a little clearer.
Y. Soc. What was the error of which, as you
say, we were guilty in our recent division?
Str. The error was just as if some one who
wanted to divide the human race, were to divide them
after the fashion which prevails in this part of the
world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one
species, and all the other species of mankind, which
are innumerable, and have no ties or common
language, they include under the single name of
"barbarians," and because they have one name they
are supposed to be of one species also. Or suppose
that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten
thousand from all the rest, and make of it one
species, comprehending the first under another
separate name, you might say that here too was a
single class, because you had given it a single
name. Whereas you would make a much better and more
equal and logical classification of numbers, if you
divided them into odd and even; or of the human
species, if you divided them into male and female;
and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any
other tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of
the world, when you could no longer make a division
into parts which were also classes.
Y. Soc. Very true; but I wish that this
distinction between a part and a class could still
be made somewhat plainer.
Str. O Socrates, best of men, you are
imposing upon me a very difficult task. We have
already digressed further from our original
intention than we ought, and you would have us
wander still further away. But we must now return to
our subject; and hereafter, when there is a leisure
hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same
time I wish you to guard against imagining that you
ever heard me declare-
Y. Soc. What?
Str. That a class and a part are distinct.
Y. Soc. What did I hear, then?
Str. That a class is necessarily a part, but
there is no similar necessity that a part should be
a dass; that is the view which I should always wish
you to attribute to me, Socrates.
Y. Soc. So be it.
Str. There is another thing which I should
like to know.
Y. Soc. What is it?
Str. The point at which we digressed; for, if
I am not mistaken, the exact place was at the
question, Where you would divide the management of
herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to
answer that them were two species of animals; man
being one, and all brutes making up the other.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. I thought that in taking away a part you
imagined that the remainder formed a class, because
you were able to call them by the common name of
brutes.
Y. Soc. That again is true.
Str. Suppose now, O most courageous of
dialecticians, that some wise and understanding
creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in
imitation of you, to make a similar division, and
set up cranes against all other animals to their own
special glorification, at the same time jumbling
together all the others, including man, under the
appellation of brutes,-here would be the sort of
error which we must try to avoid.
Y. Soc. How can we be safe?
Str. If we do not divide the whole class of
animals, we shall be less likely to fall into that
error.
Y. Soc. We had better not take the whole?
Str. Yes, there lay the source of error in
our former division.
Y. Soc. How?
Str. You remember how that part of the art of
knowledge which was concerned with command, had to
do with the rearing of living creatures,-I mean,
with animals in herds?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. In that case, there was already implied
a division of all animals into tame and wild; those
whose nature can be tamed are called tame, and those
which cannot be tamed are called wild.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. And the political science of which we
are in search, is and ever was concerned with tame
animals, and is also confined to gregarious animals.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. But then ought not to divide, as we did,
taking the whole class at once. Neither let us be in
too great haste to arrive quickly at the political
science; for this mistake has already brought upon
us the misfortune of which the proverb speaks.
Y. Soc. What misfortune?
Str. The misfortune of too much haste, which
is too little speed.
Y. Soc. And all the better, Stranger;-we got
what we deserved.
Str. Very well: Let us then begin again, and
endeavour to divide the collective rearing of
animals; for probably the completion of the argument
will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell
me, then-
Y. Soc. What?
Str. Have you ever heard, as you very likely
may-for I do not suppose that you ever actually
visited them-of the preserves of fishes in the Nile,
and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have
seen similar preserves in wells at home?
Y. Soc. Yes, to be sure, I have seen them,
and I have often heard the others described.
Str. And you may have heard also, and may
have been-assured by report, although you have not
travelled in those regions, of nurseries of geese
and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. I asked you, because here is a new
division of the management of herds, into the
management of land and of water herds.
Y. Soc. There is.
Str. And do you agree that we ought to divide
the collective rearing of herds into two
corresponding parts, the one the rearing of water,
and the other the rearing of land herds?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. There is surely no need to ask which of
these two contains the royal art, for it is evident
to everybody.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Any one can divide the herds which feed
on dry land?
Y. Soc. How would you divide them?
Str. I should distinguish between those which
fly and those which walk.
Y. Soc. Most true.
Str. And where shall we look for the
political animal? Might not an idiot, so to speak,
know that he is a pedestrian?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. The art of managing the walking animal
has to be further divided, just as you might have an
even number.
Y. Soc. Clearly.
Str. Let me note that here appear in view two
ways to that part or class which the argument aims
at reaching-the one is speedier way, which cuts off
a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees
better with the principle which we were laying down,
that as far as we can we should divide in the
middle; but it is longer. We can take either of
them, whichever we please.
Y. Soc. Cannot we have both ways?
Str. Together? What a thing to ask! but, if
you take them in turn, you clearly may.
Y. Soc. Then I should like to have them in
turn.
Str. There will be no difficulty, as we are
near the end; if we had been at the beginning, or in
the middle, I should have demurred to your request;
but now, in accordance with your desire, let us
begin with the longer way; while we are fresh, we
shall get on better. And now attend to the division.
Y. Soc. Let me hear.
Str. The tame walking herding animals are
distributed by nature into two classes.
Y. Soc. Upon what principle?
Str. The one grows horns; and the other is
without horns.
Y. Soc. Clearly.
Str. Suppose that you divide the science
which manages pedestrian animals into two
corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try
to invent names for them, you will find the
intricacy too great.
Y. Soc. How must I speak of them, then?
Str. In this way: let the science of managing
pedestrian animals be divided into two parts and one
part assigned to the horned herd and the other to
the herd that has no horns.
Y. Soc. All that you say has been abundantly
proved, and may therefore, be assumed.
Str. The king is clearly the shepherd a
polled herd, who have no horns.
Y. Soc. That is evident.
Str. Shall we break up this hornless herd
into sections, and endeavour to assign to him what
is his?
Y. Soc. By all means.
Str. Shall we distinguish them by their
having or not having cloven feet, or by their mixing
or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean.
Y. Soc. What?
Str. I mean that horses and asses naturally
breed from one another.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. But the remainder of the hornless herd
of tame animals will not mix the breed.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. And of which has the Statesman
charge,-of the mixed or of the unmixed race?
Y. Soc. Clearly of the unmixed.
Str. I suppose that we must divide this again
as before.
Y. Soc. We must.
Str. Every tame and herding animal has now
been split up, with the exception of two species;
for I hardly think that dogs should be reckoned
among gregarious animals.
Y. Soc. Certainly not; but how shall we
divide the two remaining species?
Str. There is a measure of difference which
may be appropriately employed by you and Theaetetus,
who are students of geometry.
Y. Soc. What is that?
Str. The diameter; and, again, the diameter
of a diameter.
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. How does man walk, but as a diameter
whose power is two feet?
Y. Soc. Just so.
Str. And the power of the remaining kind,
being the power of twice two feet, may be said to be
the diameter of our diameter.
Y. Soc. Certainly; and now I think that I
pretty nearly understand you.
Str. In these divisions, Socrates, I descry
what would make another famous jest.
Y. Soc. What is it?
Str. Human beings have come out in the same
class with the freest and airiest of creation, and
have been running a race with them.
Y. Soc. I remark that very singular
coincidence.
Str. And would you not expect the slowest to
arrive last?
Y. Soc. Indeed I should.
Str. And there is a still more ridiculous
consequence, that the king is found running about
with the herd and in close competition with the
bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept
at the airy life.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Then here, Socrates, is still clearer
evidence of the truth of what was said in the
enquiry about the Sophist?
Y. Soc. What?
Str. That the dialectical method is no
respecter of persons, and does not set the great
above the small, but always arrives in her own way
at the truest result.
Y. Soc. Clearly.
Str. And now, I will not wait for you to ask
the, but will of my own accord take you by the
shorter road to the definition of a king.
Y. Soc. By all means.
Str. I say that we should have begun at first
by dividing land animals into biped and quadruped;
and since the winged herd, and that alone, comes out
in the same class with man, should divide bipeds
into those which have feathers and those which have
not, and when they have been divided, and the art of
the management of mankind is brought to light, the
time will have come to produce our Statesman and
ruler, and set him like a charioteer in his place,
and hand over to him the reins of state, for that
too is a vocation which belongs to him.
Y. Soc. Very good; you have paid me the
debt-I mean, that you have completed the argument,
and I suppose that you added the digression by way
of interest.
Str. Then now, let us go back to the
beginning, and join the links, which together make
the definition of the name of the Statesman's art.
Y. Soc. By all means.
Str. The science of pure knowledge had, as we
said originally, a part which was the science of
rule or command, and from this was derived another
part, which was called command-for-self, on the
analogy of selling-for-self; an important section of
this was the management of living animals, and this
again was further limited to the manage merit of
them in herds; and again in herds of pedestrian
animals. The chief division of the latter was the
art of managing pedestrian animals which are without
horns; this again has a part which can only be
comprehended under one term by joining together
three names-shepherding pure-bred animals. The only
further subdivision is the art of man herding-this
has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking
after, and have now found, being at once the royal
and political.
Y. Soc. To be sure.
Str. And do you think, Socrates, that we
really have done as you say?
Y. Soc. What?
Str. Do you think, I mean, that we have
really fulfilled our intention?-There has been a
sort of discussion, and yet the investigation seems
to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is where
the enquiry fails.
Y. Soc. I do not understand.
Str. I will try to make the thought, which is
at this moment present in my mind, clearer to us
both.
Y. Soc. Let me hear.
Str. There were many arts of shepherding, and
one of them was the political, which had the charge
of one particular herd?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. And this the argument defined to be the
art of rearing, not horses or other brutes, but the
art of rearing man collectively?
Y. Soc. True.
Str. Note, however, a difference which
distinguishes the king from all other shepherds.
Y. Soc. To what do you refer?
Str. I want to ask, whether any one of the
other herdsmen has a rival who professes and claims
to share with him in the management of the herd?
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. I mean to say that merchants husbandmen,
providers of food, and also training-masters and
physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen of
humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that
they themselves have the care of rearing of managing
mankind, and that they rear not only the common
herd, but also the rulers themselves.
Y. Soc. Are they not right in saying so?
Str. Very likely they may be, and we will
consider their claim. But we are certain of
this,-that no one will raise a similar claim as
against the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to
be the sole and only feeder and physician of his
herd; he is also their matchmaker and accoucheur; no
one else knows that department of science. And he is
their merry-maker and musician, as far as their
nature is susceptible of such influences, and no one
can console and soothe his own herd better than he
can, either with the natural tones of his voice or
with instruments. And the same may be said of
tenders of animals in general.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. But if this is as you say, can our
argument about the king be true and unimpeachable?
Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand
other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the
human flock?
Y. Soc. Surely not.
Str. Had we not reason just to now apprehend,
that although we may have described a sort of royal
form, we have not as yet accurately worked out the
true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot
reveal him as he truly is in his own nature, until
we have disengaged and separated him from those who
bang about him and claim to share in his
prerogatives?
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. And that, Socrates, is what we must do,
if we do not mean to bring disgrace upon the
argument at its close.
Y. Soc. We must certainly avoid that.
Str. Then let us make a new beginning, and
travel by a different road.
Y. Soc. What road?
Str. I think that we may have a little
amusement; there is a famous tale, of which a good
portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then
we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed
in the old path until we arrive at the desired
summit. Shall we do as I say?
Y. Soc. By all means.
Str. Listen, then, to a tale which a child
would love to hear; and you are not too old for
childish amusement.
Y. Soc. Let me hear.
Str. There did really happen, and will again
happen, like many other events of which ancient
tradition has preserved the record, the portent
which is traditionally said to have occurred in the
quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes. You have heard no
doubt, and remember what they say happened at that
time?
Y. Soc. I suppose you to mean the token of
the birth of the golden lamb.
Str. No, not that; but another part of the
story, which tells how the sun and the stars once
rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the
god reversed their motion, and gave them that which
they now have as a testimony to the right of Atreus.
Y. Soc. Yes; there is that legend also.
Str. Again, we have been often told of the
reign of Cronos.
Y. Soc. Yes, very often.
Str. Did you ever hear that the men of former
times were earthborn, and not begotten of one
another?
Y. Soc. Yes, that is another old tradition.
Str. All these stories, and ten thousand
others which are still more wonderful, have a common
origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse of
ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form;
but the origin of them is what no one has told, and
may as well be told now; for the tale is suited to
throw light on the nature of the king.
Y. Soc. Very good; and I hope that you will
give the whole story, and leave out nothing.
Str. Listen, then. There is a time when God
himself guides and helps to roll the world in its
course; and there is a time, on the completion of a
certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being
a living creature, and having originally received
intelligence from its author and creator turns about
and by an inherent necessity revolves in the
opposite direction.
Y. Soc. Why is that?
Str. Why, because only the most divine things
of all remain ever unchanged and the same, and body
is not included in this class. Heaven and the
universe, as we have termed them, although they have
been endowed by the Creator with many glories,
partake of a bodily nature, and therefore cannot be
entirely free from perturbation. But their motion
is, as far as possible, single and in the same
place, and of the same kind; and is therefore only
subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration
possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone
able to move of himself; and to think that he moves
them at one time in one direction and at another
time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must not say
that the world is either self-moved always, or all
made to go round by God in two opposite courses; or
that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it
move round. But as I have already said (and this is
the only remaining alternative) the world is guided
at one time by an external power which is divine and
receives fresh life and immortality from the
renewing hand of the Creator, and again, when let
go, moves spontaneously, being set free at such a
time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a
reverse movement: this is due to its perfect
balance, to its vast size, and to the fact that it
turns on the smallest pivot.
Y. Soc. Your account of the world seems to be
very reasonable indeed.
Str. Let us now reflect and try to gather
from what has been said the nature of the phenomenon
which we affirmed to be the cause of all these
wonders. It is this.
Y. Soc. What?
Str. The reversal which takes place from time
to time of the motion of the universe.
Y. Soc. How is that the cause?
Str. Of all changes of the heavenly motions,
we may consider this to be the greatest and most
complete.
Y. Soc. I should imagine so.
Str. And it may be supposed to result in the
greatest changes to the human beings who are the
inhabitants of the world at the time.
Y. Soc. Such changes would naturally occur.
Str. And animals, as we know, survive with
difficulty great and serious changes of many
different kinds when they come upon them at once.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Hence there necessarily occurs a great
destruction of them, which extends also to-the life
of man; few survivors of the race are left, and
those who remain become the subjects of several
novel and remarkable phenomena, and of one in
particular, which takes place at the time when the
transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in
which we are now living.
Y. Soc. What is it?
Str. The life of all animals first came to a
standstill, and the mortal nature ceased to be or
look older, and was then reversed and grew young and
delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened
again, and the cheeks the bearded man became smooth,
and recovered their former bloom; the bodies of
youths in their prime grew softer and smaller,
continually by day and night returning and becoming
assimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in
mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they
wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies
of those who died by violence at that time quickly
passed through the like changes, and in a few days
were no more seen.
Y. Soc. Then how, Stranger, were the animals
created in those days; and in what way were they
begotten of one another?
Str. It is evident, Socrates, that there was
no such thing in the then order of nature as the
procreation of animals from one another; the
earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the
one which existed in those days-they rose again from
the ground; and of this tradition, which is
now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors,
who were nearest in point of time to the end of the
last period and came into being at the beginning of
this, are to us the heralds. And mark how consistent
the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age
to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are
lying in the earth, to life; simultaneously with the
reversal of the world the wheel of their generation
has been turned back, and they are put together and
rise and live in the opposite order, unless God has
carried any of them away to some other lot.
According to this tradition they of necessity sprang
from the earth and have the name of earth-born, and
so the above legend clings to them.
Y. Soc. Certainly that is quite consistent
with what has preceded; but tell me, was the life
which you said existed in the reign of Cronos in
that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change
in the course of the stars and the sun must have
occurred in both.
Str. I see that you enter into my
meaning;-no, that blessed and spontaneous life does
not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to
the previous one, in which God superintended the
whole revolution of the universe; and the several
parts the universe were distributed under the rule.
certain inferior deities, as is the way in some
places still There were demigods, who were the
shepherds of the various species and herds of
animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient
for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was
there any violence, or devouring of one another or
war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten
thousand other blessings, which belonged to that
dispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as
tradition says, spontaneous, is as follows: In those
days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over
them, just as man, over them, who is by comparison a
divine being, still rules over the lower animals.
Under him there were no forms of government or
separate possession of women and children; for all
men rose again from the earth, having no memory, of
the past. And although they had nothing of this
sort, the earth gave them fruits in abundance, which
grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not
planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked,
and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of
their seasons, was mild; and they had no beds, but
lay on Soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully
out of: the earth. Such was the life of man in the
days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of our
present life which is said to be under Zeus, you
know from your own experience. Can you, and will
you, determine which of them you deem the happier?
Y. Soc. Impossible.
Str. Then shall I determine for you as well
as I can?
Y. Soc. By all means.
Str. Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos,
having this boundless leisure, and the power of
holding intercourse, not only with men, but with the
brute creation, had used all these advantages with a
view to philosophy, conversing with the brutes as
well as with one another, and learning of every
nature which was gifted with any special power, and
was able to contribute some special experience to
the store of wisdom there would be no difficulty in
deciding that they would be a thousand times happier
than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had
merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and
told stories to one another and to the animals-such
stories as are now attributed to them-in this case
also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy.
But until some satisfactory witness can be found of
the love of that age for knowledge and: discussion,
we had better let the matter drop, and give the
reason why we have unearthed this tale, and then we
shall be able to get on.
In the fulness of time, when the change was to take
place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and
every soul had completed its proper cycle of births
and been sown in the earth her appointed number of
times, the pilot of the universe let the helm go,
and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and
innate desire reversed the motion of the world. Then
also all the inferior deities who share the rule of
the supreme power, being informed of what was
happening, let go the parts of the world which were
under their control. And the world turning round
with a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite
direction from beginning to end, was shaken by a
mighty earthquake, which wrought a new destruction
of all manner of animals. Afterwards, when
sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and
confusion and earthquake ceased, and the universal
creature, once more at peace attained to a calm, and
settle down into his own orderly and accustomed
course, having the charge and rule of himself and of
all the creatures which are contained in him, and
executing, as far as he remembered them, the
instructions of his Father and Creator, more
precisely at first, but afterwords with less
exactness. The reason of the falling off was the
admixture of matter in him; this was inherent in the
primal nature, which was full of disorder, until
attaining to the present order. From God, the
constructor; the world received all that is good in
him, but from a previous state came elements of evil
and unrighteousness, which, thence derived, first of
all passed into the world, and were then transmitted
to the animals. While the world was aided by the
pilot in nurturing the animals, the evil was small,
and great the good which he produced, but after the
separation, when the world was let go, at first all
proceeded well enough; but, as time went there was
more and more forgetting, and the old discord again
held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at last
small was the good, and great was the admixture of
evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin to
the world, and the things contained in him.
Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender
care, seeing that the world was in great straits,
and fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm
and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated
himself at the helm; and bringing back the elements
which had fallen into dissolution and disorder to
the motion which had prevailed under his
dispensation, he set them in order and restored
them, and made the world imperishable and immortal.
And this is the whole tale, of which the first part
will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king.
For when the world turned towards the present cycle
of generation, the age of man again stood still, and
a change opposite to the previous one was the
result. The small creatures which had almost
disappeared grew in and stature, and the newly-born
children of the earth became grey and died and sank
into the earth again. All things changed, imitating
and following the condition of the universe, and of
necessity agreeing with that in their mode of
conception and generation and nurture; for no
animal; was any longer allowed to come into being in
the earth through the agency of other creative
beings, but as the world was ordained to be the lord
of his own progress, in like manner the parts were
ordained to grow and generate and give nourishment,
as far as they could, of themselves, impelled by a
similar movement. And so we have arrived at the real
end of this discourse; for although there might be
much to tell of the lower animals, and of the
condition out of which they changed and of the
causes of the change, about men there is not much,
and that little is more to the purpose. Deprived of
the care of God, who had possessed and tended them,
they were left helpless and defenceless, and were
torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally
fierce and had now grown wild. And in the first ages
they were still without skill or resource; the food
which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as yet
they knew not how to procure it, because they-had
never felt the pressure of necessity. For all these
reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore also
the gifts spoken of in the old tradition were
imparted to man by the gods, together with so much
teaching and education as was indispensable; fire
was given to them by Prometheus, the arts by
Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and
plants by others. From these is derived all that has
helped to frame human life; since the care of the
Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men, and they
had to order their course of life for themselves,
and were their own masters, just like the universal
creature whom they imitate and follow, ever
changing, as he changes, and ever living and
growing, at one time in one manner, and at another
time in another. Enough of the story, which may be
of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the
delineation of the king and the statesman in our
previous discourse.
Y. Soc. What was this great error of which
you speak?
Str. There were two; the first a lesser one,
the other was an error on a much larger and grander
scale.
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. I mean to say that when we were asked
about a king and statesman of the present; and
generation, we told of a shepherd of a human flock
who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was
a god when he ought to have been a man; and this a
great error. Again, we declared him to be, the ruler
of the entire State, without, explaining how: this
was not the whole truth, nor very intelligible; but
still it was true, and therefore the second error
was not so, great as the first.
Y Soc. Very good.
Str. Before we can expect to have a perfect
description of the statesman we must define the
nature of his office.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. And the myth was introduced in order to
show, not only that all others are rivals of true
shepherd who is the object of our search, but in
order that we might have a clearer view of him who
is alone worthy to receive this appellation,
because, he alone of shepherds and herdsmen,
according to the image which we have employed, has
the care of human beings.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. And I cannot help thinking, Socrates,
that the form of the divine shepherd is even higher
than that of a king; whereas the statesmen who are
now on earth seem to be much more like their
subjects in character, and which more nearly to
partake of their breeding and education.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Still they must be investigated all the
same, to see whether, like the divine shepherd, they
are above their subjects or on a level with them.
Y. Soc. Of course.
Str. To resume:-Do you remember that we spoke
of a command-for-self exercised over animals, not
singly but collectively, which we called the art of
rearing a herd?
Y. Soc. Yes, I remember.
Str. There, somewhere, lay our error; for we
never included or mentioned the Statesman; and we
did not observe that he had no place in our
nomenclature.
Y. Soc. How was that?
Str. All other herdsmen "rear" their herds,
but this is not a suitable term to apply to the
Statesman; we should use a name which is common to
them all.
Y. Soc. True, if there be such a name.
Str. Why, is not "care" of herds applicable
to all? For this implies no feeding, or any special
duty; if we say either "tending" the herds, or
"managing" the herds, or "having the care" of them,
the same word will include all, and then we may wrap
up the Statesman with the rest, as the argument
seems to require.
Y. Soc. Quite right; but how shall we take
the-next step in the division?
Str. As before we divided the art of
"rearing" herds accordingly as they were land or
water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not
mixing the breed, horned and hornless, so we may
divide by these same differences the "teading" of
herds, comprehending in our definition the kingship
of to-day and the rule of Cronos.
Y. Soc. That is clear; but I still ask, what
is to follow.
Str. If the word had been "managing" herds,
instead of feeding or rearing them, no one would
have argued that there was no care of men in the
case of the politician, although it was justly
contended, that there was no human art of feeding
them which was worthy of the name, or at least, if
there were, many a man had a prior and greater right
to share in such an art than any king.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. But no other art or science will have a
prior or better right than the royal science to care
for human society and to rule over men in general.
Y. Soc. Quite true.
Str. In the next place, Socrates, we must
surely notice that a great error was committed at
the end of our analysis.
Y. Soc. What was it?
Str. Why, supposing we were ever so sure that
there is such an art as the art of rearing or
feeding bipeds, there was no reason why we should
call this the royal or political art, as though
there were no more to be said.
Y. Soc. Certainly not.
Str. Our first duty, as we were saying, was
to remodel the name, so as to have the notion of
care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, for
there may be still considerable divisions.
Y. Soc. How can they be made?
Str. First, by separating the divine shepherd
from the human guardian or manager.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. And the art of management which is
assigned to man would again have to be subdivided.
Y. Soc. On what principle?
Str. On the principle of voluntary and
compulsory.
Y. Soc. Why?
Str. Because, if I am not mistaken, there has
been an error here; for our simplicity led us to
rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are
utterly distinct, like their modes of government.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. Then, now, as I said, let us make the
correction and divide human care into two parts, on
the principle of voluntary and compulsory.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. And if we call the management of violent
rulers tyranny, and the voluntary management of
herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not
further assert that he who has this latter art of
management is the true king and statesman?
Y. Soc. I think, Stranger, that we have now
completed the account of the Statesman.
Str. Would that we had Socrates, but I have
to satisfy myself as well as you; and in my judgment
the figure of the king is not yet perfected; like
statuaries who, in their too great haste, having
overdone the several parts of their work, lose time
in cutting them down, so too we, partly out of
haste, partly out of haste, partly out of a
magnanimous desire to expose our former error, and
also because we imagined that a king required grand
illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of
fable, and have been obliged to use more than was
necessary. This made us discourse at large, and,
nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And
our discussion might be compared to a picture of
some living being which had been fairly drawn in
outline, but had not yet attained the life and
clearness which is given by the blending of colours.
Now to intelligent persons a living being had better
be delineated by language and discourse than by any
painting or work of art: to the duller sort by works
of art.
Y. Soc. Very true; but what is the
imperfection which still remains? I wish that you
would tell me.
Str. The higher ideas, my dear friend, can
hardly be set forth except through the medium of
examples; every man seems to know all things in a
dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to
know nothing.
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. I fear that I have been unfortunate in
raising a question about our experience of
knowledge.
Y. Soc. Why so?
Str. Why, because my "example" requires the
assistance of another example.
Y. Soc. Proceed; you need not fear that I
shall tire.
Str. I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a
ready listener in you: when children are beginning
to know their letters-
Y. Soc. What are you going to say?
Str. That they distinguish the several
letters well enough in very short and easy
syllables, and are able to tell them correctly.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Whereas in other syllables they do not
recognize them, and think and speak falsely of them.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Will not the best and easiest way of
bringing them to a knowledge of what they do not as
yet know be-
Y. Soc. Be what?
Str. To refer them first of all to cases in
which they judge correctly about the letters in
question, and then to compare these with the cases
in which they do not as yet know, and to show them
that the letters are the same, and have the same
character in both combination, until all cases in
which they are right have been Placed side by side
with all cases in which they are wrong. In this way
they have examples, and are made to learn that each
letter in every combination is always the same and
not another, and is always called by the same name.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Are not examples formed in this manner?
We take a thing and compare it with another distinct
instance of the same thing, of which we have a right
conception, and out of the comparison there arises
one true notion, which includes both of them.
Y. Soc. Exactly.
Str. Can we wonder, then, that the soul has
the same uncertainty about the alphabet of things,
and sometimes and in some cases is firmly fixed by
the truth in each particular, and then, again, in
other cases is altogether at sea; having somehow or
other a correction of combinations; but when the
elements are transferred into the long and difficult
language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of
them?
Y. Soc. There is nothing wonderful in that.
Str. Could any one, my friend, who began with
false opinion ever expect to arrive even at a small
portion of truth and to attain wisdom?
Y. Soc. Hardly.
Str. Then you and I will not be far wrong in
trying to see the nature of example in general in a
small and particular instance; afterwards from
lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class,
which is the highest form of the same nature, and
endeavour to discover by rules of art what the
management of cities is; and then the dream will
become a reality to us.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Then, once more, let us resume the
previous argument, and as there were innumerable
rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care
of states, let us part them all off, and leave him
alone; and, as I was saying, a model or example of
this process has first to be framed.
Y. Soc. Exactly.
Str. What model is there which is small, and
yet has any analogy with the political occupation?
Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other example
at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely,
weaving of wool-this will be quite enough, without
taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate our
meaning?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Why should we not apply to weaving the
same processes of division and subdivision which we
have already applied to other classes; going once
more as rapidly as we can through all the steps
until we come to that which is needed for our
purpose?
Y. Soc. How do you mean?
Str. I shall reply by actually performing the
process.
Y. Soc. Very good.
Str. All things which we make or acquire are
either creative or preventive; of the preventive
class are antidotes, divine and human, and also
defences; and defences are either military weapons
or protections; and protections are veils, and also
shields against heat and cold, and shields against
heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and
coverings are blankets and garments; and garments
are some of them in one piece, and others of them
are made in several parts; and of these latter some
are stitched, others are fastened and not stitched;
and of the not stitched, some are made of the sinews
of plants, and some of hair; and of these, again,
some are cemented with water and earth, and others
are fastened together by themselves. And these last
defences and coverings which are fastened together
by themselves are called clothes, and the art which
superintends them we may call, from the nature of
the operation, the art of clothing, just as before
the art of the Statesman was derived from the State;
and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least
that largest portion of it which was concerned with
the making of clothes, differs only in name from
this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the
previous case, the royal science differed from the
political?
Y. Soc. Most true.
Str. In the next place, let us make the
reflection, that the art of weaving clothes, which
an incompetent person might fancy to have been
sufficiently described, has been separated off from
several others which are of the same family, but not
from the co-operative arts.
Y. Soc. And which are the kindred arts?
Str. I see that I have not taken you with me.
So I think that we had better go backwards, starting
from the end. We just now parted off from the
weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which
differ from each other in that one is put under and
the other is put around! and these are what I termed
kindred arts.
Y. Soc. I understand.
Str. And we have subtracted the manufacture
of all articles made of flax and cords, and all that
we just now metaphorically termed the sinews of
plants, and we have also separated off the process
of felting and the putting together of materials by
stitching and sewing, of which the most important
part is the cobbler's art.
Y. Soc. Precisely.
Str. Then we separated off the currier's art,
which prepared coverings in entire pieces, and the
art of sheltering, and subtracted the various arts
of making water-tight which are employed in
building, and in general in carpentering, and in
other crafts, and all such arts as furnish
impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and
are concerned with making the lids of boxes and the
fixing of doors, being divisions of the art of
joining; and we also cut off the manufacture of
arms, which is a section of the great and manifold
art of making defences; and we originally began by
parting off the whole of the magic art which is
concerned with antidoter, and have left, as would
appear, the very art of which we were in search, the
art of protection against winter cold, which
fabricates woollen defences, and has the name of
weaving.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for
the first process to which the material is subjected
is the opposite of weaving.
Y. Soc. How so?
Str. Weaving is a sort of uniting?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. But the first process is a separation of
the clotted and matted fibres?
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. I mean the work of the carder's art; for
we cannot say that carding is weaving, or that the
carder is a weaver.
Y. Soc. Certainly not.
Str. Again, if a person were to say that the
art of making the warp and the woof was the art of
weaving, he would say what was paradoxical and
false.
Y. Soc. To be sure.
Str. Shall we say that the whole art of the
fuller or of the mender has nothing to do with the
care and treatment clotes, or are we to regard all
these as arts of weaving?
Y. Soc. Certainly not.
Str. And yet surely all these arts will
maintain that they are concerned with the treatment
and production of clothes; they will dispute the
exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though
assigning a larger sphere to that, will still
reserve a considerable field for themselves.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Besides these, there are the arts which
make tools and instruments of weaving, and which
will claim at least to be cooperative causes in
every work of the weaver.
Y. Soc. Most true.
Str. Well, then, suppose that we define
weaving, or rather that part of it which has been
selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of
arts which are concerned with woollen garments-shall
we be right? Is not the definition, although true,
wanting in clearness and completeness; for do not
all those other arts require to be first cleared
away?
Y. Soc. True.
Str. Then the next thing will be to separate
them, in order that the argument may proceed in a
regular manner?
Y. Soc. By all means.
Str. Let us consider, in the first place,
that there are two kinds of arts entering into
everything which we do.
Y. Soc. What are they?
Str. The one kind is the conditional or
cooperative, the other the principal cause.
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. The arts which do not manufacture the
actual thing, but which furnish the necessary tools
for the manufacture, without which the several arts
could not fulfil their appointed work, are
co-operative; but those which make the things
themselves are causal.
Y. Soc. A very reasonable distinction.
Str. Thus the arts which make spindles,
combs, and other instruments of the production of
clothes may be called co-operative, and those which
treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. The arts of washing and mending, and the
other preparatory arts which belong to the causal
class, and form a division of the great art of
adornment, may be all comprehended under what we
call the fuller's art.
Y. Soc. Very good.
Str. Carding and spinning threads and all the
parts of the process which are concerned with the
actual manufacture of a woollen garment form a
single art, which is one of thow universally
acknowledged-the art of working in wool.
Y. Soc. To be sure.
Str. Of working in wool again, there are two
divisions, and both these are parts of two arts at
once.
Y. Soc. How is that?
Str. Carding and one half of the use of the
comb, and the other processes of wool-working which
separate the composite, may be classed together as
belonging both to the art of woolworking, and also
to one of the two great arts which are of universal
application-the art of composition and the art of
division.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. To the latter belong carding and the
other processes of which I was just now speaking the
art of discernment or division in wool and yarn,
which is effected in one manner with the comb and in
another with the hands, is variously described under
all the names which I just now mentioned.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Again, let us take some process of
woolworking which is also a portion of the art of
composition, and, dismissing the elements of
division which we found there, make two halves, one
on the principle of composition, and the other on
the principle of division.
Y. Soc. Let that be done.
Str. And once more, Socrates, we must divide
the part which belongs at once both to woolworking
and composition, if we are ever to discover
satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.
Y. Soc. We must.
Str. Yes, certainly, and let us call one part
of the art the art of twisting threads, the other
the art of combining them.
Y. Soc. Do I understand you, in speaking of
twisting, to be referring to manufacture of the
warp?
Str. Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by
twisting, is the woof made?
Y. Soc. There is no other way.
Str. Then suppose that you define the warp
and the woof, for I think that the definition will
be of use to you.
Y. Soc. How shall I define them?
Str. As thus: A piece of carded wool which is
drawn out lengthwise and breadth-wise is said to be
pulled out.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. And the wool thus prepared when twisted
by the spindle, and made into a firm thread, is
called the warp, And the art which regulates these
operations the art of spinning the warp.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. And the threads which are more loosely
spun, having a softness proportioned to the
intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force
used in dressing the cloth-the threads which are
thus spun are called the woof, and the art which is
set over them may be called the art of spinning the
woof.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. And, now, there can be no mistake about
the nature of the part of weaving which we have
undertaken to define. For when that part of the art
of composition which is employed in the working of
wool forms a web by the regular intertexture of warp
and woof, the entire woven substance is called by us
a woollen garment, and the art which presides over
this is the art of weaving.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. But why did we not say at once that
weaving is the art of entwining warp and woof,
instead of making a long and useless circuit?
Y. Soc. I thought, Stranger, that there was
nothing useless in what was said.
Str. Very likely, but you may not always
think so, my sweet friend; and in case any feeling
of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your
mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a
principle which will apply to arguments in general.
Y. Soc. Proceed.
Str. Let us begin by considering the whole
nature of excess and defect, and then we shall have
a rational ground on which we may praise or blame
too much length or too much shortness in discussions
of this kind.
Y. Soc. Let us do so.
Str. The points on which I think that we
ought to dwell are the following:-
Y. Soc. What?
Str. Length and shortness, excess and defect;
with all of these the art of measurement is
conversant.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. And the art of measurement has to be
divided into two parts, with a view to our present
purpose.
Y. Soc. Where would you make the division?
Str. As thus: I would make two parts, one
having regard to the relativity of greatness and
smallness to each other; and there is another,
without which the existence of production would be
impossible.
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. Do you not think that it is only natural
for the greater to be called greater with reference
to the less alone, and the less reference to the
greater alone?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. Well, but is there not also something
exceeding and exceeded by the principle of the mean,
both in speech and action, and is not this a
reality, and the chief mark of difference between
good and bad men?
Y. Soc. Plainly.
Str. Then we must suppose that the great and
small exist and are discerned in both these ways,
and not, as we were saying before, only relatively
to one another, but there must also be another
comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard;
would you like to hear the reason why?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. If we assume the greater to exist only
in relation to the less, there will never be any
comparison of either with the mean.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. And would not this doctrine be the ruin
of all the arts and their creations; would not the
art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of
weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the
watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities,
but as real evils, which occasion a difficulty in
action; and the excellence of beauty of every work
of art is due to this observance of measure.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. But if the science of the Statesman
disappears, the search for the royal science will be
impossible.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Well, then, as in the case of the
Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had
an existence, because here was the point at which
the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must
endeavour to show that the greater and, less are not
only to be measured with one another, but also have
to do with the production of the mean; for if this
is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other
man of action can be an undisputed master of his
science.
Y. Soc. Yes, we must certainly do again what
we did then.
Str. But this, Socrates, is a greater work
than the other, of which we only too well remember
the length. I think, however, that we may fairly
assume something of this sort-
Y. Soc. What?
Str. That we shall some day require this
notion of a mean with a view to the demonstration of
absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the
very existence of the arts must be held to depend on
the possibility of measuring more or less, not only
with one another, but also with a view to the
attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand
support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which
we are maintaining; for if there are arts, there is
a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of
measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting,
there is neither.
Y. Soc. True; and what is the next step?
Str. The next step clearly is to divide the
art of measurement into two parts, all we have said
already, and to place in the one part all the arts
which measure number, length, depth, breadth,
swiftness with their opposites; and to have another
part in which they are measured with the mean, and
the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with
all those words, in short, which denote a mean or
standard removed from the extremes.
Y. Soc. Here are two vast divisions,
embracing two very different spheres.
Str. There are many accomplished men,
Socrates, who say, believing themselves to speak
wisely, that the art of measurement is universal,
and has to do with all things. And this means what
we are now saying; for all things which come within
the province of art do certainly in some sense
partake of measure. But these persons, because they
are not accustomed to distinguish classes according
to real forms, jumble together two widely different
things, relation to one another, and to a standard,
under the idea that they are the same, and also fall
into the converse error of dividing other things not
according to their real parts. Whereas the right way
is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to
go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has
found all the differences contained in it which form
distinct classes; nor again should he be able to
rest contented with the manifold diversities which
are seen in a multitude of things until he has
comprehended all of them that have any affinity
within the bounds of one similarity and embraced
them within the reality of a single kind. |